timor agora 19.2.18

TIMOR AGORA

Lixu estraga imajen Timor; "Apoia Inisiativa Movimentu Tasi Mos"
Primeiros dicionários 'online' Português/Chinês e Chinês/Português feitos a partir de Macau
Tailândia condecora responsável pela limpeza étnica da minoria muçulmana rohingya
Putin prefers Aramco to Trump’s sword dance
China Aims for the Moon – and Beyond
Alkatiri Aseita Mina Dada Mai Timor
PM Alkatiri: TL Labele Depende ba Fundu Minarai
Timor-Leste tenta último esforço para resolver impasse sobre poços de Greater Sunrise
Publicação de calendário eleitoral em Timor-Leste preocupa responsável

Lixu estraga imajen Timor; “Apoia Inisiativa Movimentu Tasi Mos”

Posted: 18 Feb 2018 12:57 PM PST

Lixu iha capital Dili sai ona fenomena ne’ebe la iha rohan atu solusiona. Iha bairo-bairo no kuaze sikun sira sidade Dili nia laran sempre iha lixu ne’ebe soe naklekar.

Maske Governu, liu husi Autoridade Munisipiu Dili, kontrata kompñia nasional balun hodi responsabiliza hamosu sidade Dili, maibe lixu kontinua envade sidade Dili. Sa tan iha tempu udan, lixu tun husi foho mai intupidu hela iha tetuk sira kapital Dili nian hodi nalihun tama to’o Estrada laran.

Iha tasi ibun sira Dili nian, hahu husi Kristu Rei tesi kai Area Branca no liu ba Bairus Pantai Kelapa nian, sempre hafutar ho lixu, hanesan plastiku, aqua mamuk, kaleng a’at, no sira seluk tan.

Direktor Trade Invest Timor Leste, Arcansio da Silva hateten, lixu nakonu iha tasi ibun estraga imajen Timor Leste. Tanba ne’e, husu ba entidades no komunidade hotu atu koida ambente tais ibun atu garante tasi ibun livre husi lixu.

“Ita nia rai tenke mos liu liu potensia iha tasi ibun hanesan iha área branka hanesan fatin desde tempu Português hanesan fatin visitantes sira mai turista lokal no internacional,” informa Arcansio da Silva ba jornalista iha área Branca, Dili, Sesta (16/2/2018).

Apoia inisiativa Movimentu Tasi Mos

Iha parte seluk, Vise Ministru Dezemvolvimentu Habitasaun no Ambiente, Abrão Grabriel do Santos Oliveira hateten, grupo Movimentu Tasi Mos hanesan fo motivasaun tanba ne’e presiza apoiu sira nia inisiativa.

“Ita hotu koalia kona-ba lixu dehan responsabilidade husi Governu, maibe ita hotu nia responsabilidad,” afirma Abrão de Oliveira. ety

GMN TV | Grupo Média Nacional

Primeiros dicionários ‘online’ Português/Chinês e Chinês/Português feitos a partir de Macau

Posted: 18 Feb 2018 10:19 AM PST
Porto, 18 fev (Lusa) – Os primeiros dicionários ‘online’ Português/Chinês e Chinês/Português agora disponibilizados foram feitos a partir de Macau por Ana Cristina Alves, demoraram cerca de um ano e da equipa que o produziu consta uma professora chinesa de português e mandarim.

Doutorada em Filosofia da História e da Cultura Chinesa, Ana Cristina Alves disse hoje à agência Lusa que quando lhe foi feito o desafio pensou que “não iria ser capaz”, pois à data lecionava na Universidade de Macau e “não tinha tempo”.

“Mas logo me foi dito que teria a equipa de informática da Porto Editora a trabalhar comigo e, ao fim de um ano o trabalho estava feito, em menos tempo do que aquele que me davam”, salientou a autora de vários livros e manuais sobre a língua e cultura chinesas.

O facto de o desafio ter sido “bastante aplacado” pela colaboração que lhe chegava do Porto, foi no “trabalho de pesquisa” na tradução para chinês moderno das entradas que lhe chegavam de Portugal que encontrou as “maiores dificuldades”.

“Foi uma pesquisa enorme pois cada entrada tem vários sentidos e havia que verificar quais eram as oportunas para cada uma delas”, explicou a docente, vincando que o trabalho feito foi no “sentido de criar um dicionário que seja básico e essencial, para os contemporâneos”.

E prosseguiu: “não se trata de um dicionário erudito, mas sim para comunicação, em que tanto os estudantes, turistas e empresários o possam utilizar”.

Para a autora dos livros “A Sabedoria Chinesa” (2005), “A Mulher na China” (2007) e do manual Chinês/Português e Português/Chinês (2010), a preparação do dicionário informático representou “um desafio muito diferente”, dada a sua “experiência ser no campo teórico, de ensino e na preparação de manuais”, recorrendo à metáfora para explicar de que modo teve de se readaptar para que a obra surgisse.

“Para o efetuar tive de despir um pouco o meu lado teórico e académico para ir ao encontro das necessidades práticas da nossa sociedade”, descreveu Ana Cristina Alves cujo critério da escolha levou a que a obra hoje publicada obrigasse a que “25 mil dessas entradas fossem retiradas, ficando só as expressões essenciais”.

A parte do dicionário feita em Macau contou ainda com outra ajuda “preciosa” da universidade local, ficando a revisão a cargo da colega chinesa Ao Sio Heng, professora de português e chinês de iniciação.

Agitada pelo “nervoso miudinho” que a acompanhou na coordenação do dicionário, a especialista confessou à Lusa que para conseguir dar resposta ao trabalho houve dias em que teve de “acordar às 02:00 para traduzir e depois ir dar aulas”.

E com a obra a ser lançada em Portugal no dia em que se assinala o Ano Novo Chinês é de um maior investimento na cultura chinesa que a autora do livro de investigação “Culturas em Diálogo. A Tradução Chinês-Português” (2016) fala.

“Os chineses gostam muito da língua deles e os carateres são uma das características da sua cultura e pode ainda muito ser feito em termos de dicionários etimológicos, de provérbios, adágios e aforismos”, desafiou.

Nos dicionários hoje disponibilizados no ‘site’ Infopédia.pt constam mais 25.500 entradas e cerca de 36.500 traduções.

JYFO/NL

Tailândia condecora responsável pela limpeza étnica da minoria muçulmana rohingya

Posted: 18 Feb 2018 10:17 AM PST

Banguecoque, 18 fev (Lusa) — A Tailândia condecorou o chefe do Exército birmanês, o general Min Aung Hlaing, considerado o arquiteto da perseguição à minoria muçulmana rohingya, classificada pelas Nações Unidas como limpeza étnica, noticiou a imprensa local.

Segundo o comandante supremo das Forças de Defesa da Tailândia, general Thanchaiyan Srisuwan, Hlaing foi distinguido com a Grande Cruz de Cavaleiro da Ordem do Elefante Branco por contribuir para a “história de cooperação” entre os dois países.

“A proximidade nas relações militares sempre melhora as coisas para que não ocorram problemas”, declarou o general tailandês.

O anúncio da condecoração ao responsável pela limpeza étnica dos rohingya integra-se numa visita oficial de três dias que o chefe do Exército birmanês iniciou na sexta-feira em Banguecoque.

Esta é a segunda condecoração que o general da Birmânia recebe da Tailândia que, em 2013, já lhe tinha atribuído a Grande Cruz de Cavaleiro da Nobre Ordem da Coroa.

Mais de 650.000 pessoas da minoria rohingya permanecem como refugiados no Bangladesh, para onde fugiram assim que começou a operação militar iniciada pelo Exército da Birmânia em agosto passado no estado de Rakéin, no oeste, onde vivia esta comunidade.

A operação incluiu milhares de assassinatos, a destruição, através de incêndios, de centenas de aldeias, a violação de mulheres, assim como a devastação de campos de cultivo e de gado, numa perseguição premedita e sistemática contra a minoria que é atribuída ao general Hlaing.

A União Europeia cortou as relações com o Exército da Birmânia na sequência desta limpeza étnica, que tem suscitado duras críticas à líder civil do país e Nobel da Paz, Aung San Suu Kyi.

A Birmânia não reconhece a cidadania aos rohingya, que considera imigrantes bengalis, e sujeita-os a diferentes tipos de discriminação, incluindo restrições à liberdade de movimentos.

Segundo a organização não-governamental Médicos sem Fronteiras, a intervenção das forças birmanesas causou a morte de pelo menos 6.700 membros desta minoria.

SR // SR

Putin prefers Aramco to Trump’s sword dance

Posted: 18 Feb 2018 09:28 AM PST

Hardly 10 months after honoring the visiting US president, the Saudis are open to a Russian-Chinese consortium investing in the upcoming Aramco IPO

By M.K. BHADRAKUMAR | Asian Times

n the slideshow that is Middle Eastern politics, the series of still images seldom add up to make an enduring narrative. And the probability is high that when an indelible image appears, it might go unnoticed – such as Russia and Saudi Arabia wrapping up huge energy deals on Wednesday underscoring a new narrative in regional and international security.

The ebb and flow of events in Syria – Turkey’s campaign in Afrin and its threat to administer an “Ottoman slap” to the United States, and the shooting down of an Israeli F-16 jet – hogged the attention. But something of far greater importance was unfolding in Riyadh, as Saudi and Russian officials met to seal major deals marking a historic challenge to the US dominance in the Persian Gulf region.

The big news is the Russian offer to the Saudi authorities to invest directly in the upcoming Aramco initial public offering – and the Saudis acknowledging the offer. Even bigger news, surely, is that Moscow is putting together a Russian-Chinese consortium of joint investment funds plus several major Russian banks to be part of the Aramco IPO.

Chinese state oil companies were interested in becoming cornerstone investors in the IPO, but the participation of a Russia-China joint investment fund takes matters to an entirely different realm. Clearly, the Chinese side is willing to hand over tens of billions of dollars.

Yet the Aramco IPO was a prime motive for US President Donald Trump to choose Saudi Arabia for his first foreign trip. The Saudi hosts extended the ultimate honor to Trump – a ceremonial sword dance outside the Murabba Palace in Riyadh. Hardly 10 months later, they are open to a Russian-Chinese consortium investing in the Aramco IPO.

Riyadh plans to sell 5% of Saudi Aramco in what is billed as the largest IPO in world history. In the Saudi estimation, Aramco is worth US$2 trillion; a 5% stake sale could fetch as much as $100 billion. The IPO is a crucial segment of Vision 2030, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s ambitious plan to diversify the kingdom’s economy.

Aramco signs MoU with Novatek

Also on Wednesday, Saudi Aramco signed a memorandum of understanding with Novatek, Russia’s largest non-state natural-gas producer, regarding Saudi investment in the latter’s LNG (liquefied natural gas) projects – specifically, in the $20 billion Arctic LNG-2, which is expected to be on stream in 2023 and has a capacity of 18 million metric tons annually.

Saudi Minister of Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources Khalid Al-Falih told the media in Riyadh, “This is a big project. It will become part of Aramco’s gas strategy.” The agreement will be showcased as the centerpiece of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in May. (Novatek is also interested in building a regasification terminal in Saudi Arabia.)

Other Saudi-Russian energy deals in the making include investment by Aramco and the Saudi sovereign wealth fund (Public Investment Fund, or PIF) in the Russian company Eurasia Driller, a major independent driller, which has been seeking entry to onshore and offshore projects in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi and Russian officials also disclosed that Russia had made a formal proposal to build two nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia and that the contract was expected to be awarded by next year.

Indeed, these deals must be seen in the backdrop of the Saudi-Russian alliance to sustain the oil price through production cuts until the end of 2018. In 2015, the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Saudi Arabia’s PIF joined hands to make investments in projects in Russia. Last year, RDIF and PIF announced the creation of a Russia-Saudi Investment Fund with total committed capital of $6 billion to pursue investment opportunities, primarily in Russia, and in joint ventures that can help Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification.

Tectonic shift

Historically, Saudi Arabia has been seen as a pivotal country in the United States’ Middle East energy strategies, which formed a core template of Cold War-era politics to keep the former Soviet Union out of the region. The past week’s developments signify that the tectonic plates are shifting.

And history might repeat. Reminiscent of the so-called Quincy Agreement of February 1945 between US president Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdul-Rahman bin Abdulaziz, founder of Saudi Arabia, the emerging Saudi-Russian energy alliance will most certainly trigger an overall expansion of relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia, including in defense and security fields.

Russian President Vladimir Putin telephoned King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on Wednesday, when they discussed “a wide range of bilateral cooperation, primarily in trade and defense technology” and “expressed readiness to boost meaningful coordination in global hydrocarbon markets,” according to Moscow. The Kremlin readout highlighted that Putin and King Salman discussed Syria and Saudi Arabia’s standoff with Qatar – and, possibly, Iran too.

Interestingly, the Kremlin statement cited Putin as regretting that “the current crisis by no means contributed to the consolidation of joint efforts in the struggle against a terrorist threat or the stabilization of the Middle East in general.” Indeed, it cannot be lost on the Saudis that what distinguishes Russian diplomacy is that unlike the traditional US tactic of exploiting regional tensions and divisions, Moscow focuses on beneficial cooperation. Quite obviously, the Russian military bases in Syria or Russia’s axis with Iran do not impede a full-bodied Saudi-Russian strategic relationship.

Suffice to say, Russia is positioning itself, in geopolitical terms, to shape outcomes in the Middle East and to enhance its standing as a great power, while also advancing its economic, political and security interests. The contrast with the US couldn’t be sharper.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported last week that while addressing a closed-door meeting of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a prominent group of industrialists and business tycoons, in Moscow on February 9, Putin predicted that “those who are doing this [imposing sanctions] will themselves tire of it soon.” The news from Riyadh signals that Putin’s prediction is well grounded.

When Russia teams up with China and Saudi Arabia in making such massive investments in the energy field, the US sanctions aimed at denying Western capital and technology to stymie Russia’s oil industry have been rendered meaningless.

Photo: Saudi Energy Minister Khalid Al-Falih and Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak attend a news conference at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh on February 14, 2018. Photo: Reuters / Faisal Al Nasser

China Aims for the Moon – and Beyond

Posted: 18 Feb 2018 09:29 AM PST

China’s space program, past, present, and future

By Nayef Al-Rodhan* | The Diplomat

China’s space program dates back to the 1950s, when China first started developing its own missiles, modeled on those of the USSR, but some would argue that the space age was actually born in China, citing its use of “fire arrows” in the 13th century as the first example of rockets. Mao Zedong himself was impressed by the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and wanted China to move forward quickly in the development of satellites. But these plans were postponed and it was not until 1970 that China launched its first small satellite, long after the United States and Russia.

An ambitious program, including the launch of astronauts to space, was approved by Mao Zedong, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, and Minister of Defense Lin Biao in 1970, but, in the turbulent political context of the 1970s, it was canceled in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, who was back to power. Deng had a very pragmatic view of the interest of space and focused the Chinese space program on practical applications, leading to the launch of the first Chinese telecommunications satellite in 1984. Since then China has successfully developed civilian and military applications, including telecommunications, remote sensing, meteorology, and navigation. However, with the rising geopolitical posture of the country, more prestige-oriented projects, in lunar and deep space exploration, and human spaceflight, were promoted in the 1990s, including the approval, in September 1992, of an orbital space station as the main goal of the program.

As a result, despite China’s late entry into space exploration – the first Chinese astronaut was not sent into space until 2003 – it has caught up lately at an impressive rate. By 2017, 11 taikonauts (a term used for Chinese astronauts) had successfully orbited the Earth, demonstrating China’s growing participation in space. In 2013, China landed the Jade Rabbit rover on the moon, representing the first time that a robot had landed on the moon’s surface in nearly half a century.

However, China’s record in space has not consistently been impressive, with the most notorious instance of irresponsible space activity being the 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test. According to official Chinese media, the test was defensive in nature. Yet in reality it was meant to test China’s ability to destroy satellites, which several militaries – and most notably the American military – depend on for communications and geolocation information. While successful in destroying one of its own weather satellites, this act has jeopardized China’s future cooperation prospects with other states. The ASAT test was highly contentious, as it produced a massive amount of space debris, endangering many other nations’ space assets. Altogether the test reinforced suspicionsabout China’s intentions in outer space.

Contemporary Assets and Policies of China

Unlike in other countries, but like in the Soviet Union in the past, China’s space program and its military are essentially the same entity. Despite China’s ongoing exclusion from the International Space Station (ISS) – due to U.S. opposition – it currently possesses many impressive space assets. In 2016, China achieved a record number of rocket launches. These included seven “Long March” rockets, including the maiden flight of the Long March 5 in November 2016. The new rocket is capable of ferrying 25 metric tons (MT) of cargo into low-Earth orbit (LEO), putting it on a par with the Delta IV Heavy and Europe’s Ariane V rockets and doubling the payload which China is able to place in space. Also in 2016, in June, China launched a new Long March 7 rocket, which is the “middle child” in the country’s arsenal of launchers, sitting between the heavier Long March 5 and the lighter Long March 6. Progress continued, despite some setbacks, in 2017, including China’s first launch of a cargo spacecraft using a Long March 7 Y2 rocket in April.

The proposed Long March 9 aims to increase payload to 140 MT for LEO, meaning that China should be able to operate large human and cargo mission and carry spacecraft within the next five to seven years. China also has its own spacecraft – known as Shenzhou – modeled on the Russian Soyuz vehicles, which has served as the primary mechanism for transporting taikonauts into and out of space, but is now due for replacement.

China additionally has a hypersonic missile program and has conducted several major tests in the last two years alone, including on missiles with nuclear capability.

China also operates its own navigation satellite system – known as BeiDou – providing regional coverage over China and the Asia-Pacific, with accuracy of up to ten centimeters. Aside from providing accurate geolocation information for Chinese weapon systems and communication coverage for its military various forms of information, users of BeiDou, which include the Pakistani military, can take advantage of a short-message service not possible with the U.S. GPS.

Another of China’s activities in space involves monitoring space debris using a tracking system. This strategy is an important aspect in repairing trust transnationally and demonstrating a commitment to the responsible and secure use of space, following the 2007 ASAT test. The Chinese Space Debris Monitoring and Application Center, which is part of the China National Space Administration, is tracking space debris with a special focus on the smallest pieces – those which are smaller than one centimeter and of which there are around 100 million. In 2015, China also launched a space junk monitoring center to protect its spacecraft in orbit.

China’s objectives as part of its outer space endeavors are declaredly defensive. According to a 2015 white papercalled “China’s Military Strategy 2015,” China’s military policy is one of active defense and its intention is to secure its spot in space for peaceful purposes, such as space exploration, supporting the economy, and developing technology.

In 2015, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, China, along with Russia, proposed an updated version of the “Treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in Outer Space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects (CD/1985).” The Russian-led proposal, known as the “no first placement” initiative, calls on nations not to deploy weapons in space. This resolution is nonbinding and intended more as a method to even the space-warfare playing field, rather than for altruistic peaceful purposes.

Some see China’s rapid expansion into space as a necessary step to change the military balance on Earth and defend its policies. By strengthening its military with space technologies (which boost military capabilities by improving communications and geolocation services), China is better placed better to defend against potentially aggressive behavior.

Future of the Chinese Space Program

In December 2016, China released a white paper detailing its plans to expand the “strength and size” of its space program. The nation plans to increase the estimated $6 billion per year it currently invests in space activities, in order to fund numerous proposed initiatives. The plan outlines a robotic lunar program made up of several missions. These include the aim of becoming the first country to soft land a probe on the far side of the moon (planned for this year) and the launch of the Chang’e-5 lunar probe – a technically complex process in which the probe will land, collect samples, return to a docking in lunar orbit, and then come back to Earth. On the surface, these missions appear largely scientific and they do indeed improve China’s capacity to explore deeper into space. However, the routinization of precision maneuvering in space also has military implications, as the technology required for such endeavors parallels the skills needed for military operations in space. These include defensive skills, such as repairing and maintaining satellites.

In addition, China’s BeiDou navigation system is on course to provide global coverage using 35 satellites by 2020. In September 2016, China sent its second space laboratory into orbit – Tiangong 2 – after it was announced that the Chinese National Space Administration had lost control of its predecessor – Tiangong 1 – and that it would reenter the Earth’s atmosphere in March 2018. The launch of Tiangong 2 was in preparation for the establishment of a permanent manned space station by 2022, finally implementing the goal approved 30 years before. The space station is being constructed at a fast pace and is scheduled for launch into orbit in 2020. With the potential retirement of the ISS after 2025, other countries could feasibly rely on China for space research, if it becomes the only country with a space station.

Recently, China became the first country to begin testing on a quantum-enabled satellite, which aims to investigation hack-proof communication keys using quantum encryption. If successful, this technology could be upscaled to create a hack-proof satellite communication network, which would naturally have great security implications, in light of the increasing threat posed by cyberattacks to communications infrastructure. This initiative, along with those mentioned previously, is clearly in line with China’s goal of becoming a global science and technology leader.

China’s tactics indicate President Xi Jinping’s strong ambitions to transform the nation into the next space power and to strengthen Chinese military capabilities at a rapid pace, while helping legitimize the regime on Earth. In the near future we could feasibly see a leveling of the outer space playing field between several major powers, or potentially the shifting of the current power in a new direction. After all, China is not the only regional space player. Japan maintains a highly sophisticated space program, and India is also developing lunar and deep-space capacities, albeit with less media attention.

Concerns over China’s role in outer space were also expressed poignantly in a testimony by James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies before the House Space Science and Technology in September 2016. China was fast consolidating its position as a top space power in the world, pursuing several largescale projects simultaneously – although still spending less than the United States and Russia on space. However, Lewis’ testimony expressed an already familiar concern: besides a few short white papers, there is a lack of transparency in China’s military space programs and its release of technical information is scarce compared to what NASA or the European Space Agency provide.

The problem of trust has already surfaced between the United States and China, and the lack of transparency in outer space affairs risks further straining the relations between the two powers. More generally, it can set a precedent for other nations too, which may feel more inclined to be more secretive about their intentions on space.

*Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan is an Honorary Fellow at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, and Senior Fellow and Head of the Geopolitics and Global Futures Program at the Geneva Center for Security Policy. He is the author of Meta-Geopolitics of Outer Space: An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Follow him on Twitter: @SustainHistory

Photo: Shenzhou 9 spacecraft rocket launches from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in China (June 16, 2012).
Image Credit: AP Photo/Ng Han Guan

Alkatiri Aseita Mina Dada Mai Timor

Posted: 18 Feb 2018 12:59 AM PST

DILI: Primeiru Mainistru (PM) Mari Bim Amudi Alkatiri deklara maske seidauk hatene destinu kadoras mina Timor atu dada ba ne’ebé, maibé ninia parte aseita di’ak liu dada mai Timor-Leste.

“Ida ne’e maka akordu ida ne’ebé atu asina daudauk. tanba ne’e kadoras seidauk deside atu ba Australia ka atu mai Timór. Ne’e duni loron 20 Marsu maka TL-Australia sei hasoru malu fali iha Malaisya antes aranka ba Nova Yorke.,” dehan PM Alkatiri ba jonalista sira, kinta (15/02) iha Palasiu Prezidensia Nicolau Lobatu Bairu Pite.

Hasoru malu ho delegasaun husi parte rua iha Malaisya ne’e nia sei la partisipa no nia rasik sei dereitamente aranka ba Nova Yorke.

“Ha’u aseita tanba uluk ha’u nunka iha mehi to’o 100%.Ne’e duni kuandu 70% mai Timor ne’e di’ak ona,”dehan Alkatiri.

Nia afirma katak, klaru tebes akordu ne’ebé Timor-Leste halo ho Australia ne’e hodi garante riku soin iha tasi laran. Ida ne’e maka tenki integra tomak iha akordu nia laran. Maibé medialine ne’e akordu ida no Greater Sunrise ne’e ekonomiku.

Maibé nia afirma atu ko’alia kona ba 70 too 80 pursentu ne’e husik depois maka bele halo kontas.

“Agora iha diferensa oituan hakarak dada ba Australia 80%. Uluk ho bayu undang 90% ema barak halo kritika ha’u. Agora ha’u la halo kritika ba ema ida tanba ha’u laiha mehi liu ida ne’e,” tenik nia.

Entertantu testu importante ne’ebé atu tama iha akordu ne’e maka area JPDA maka sai nu’udar fronteira ba Timor-Leste.

Cristina Ximenes | Independente

PM Alkatiri: TL Labele Depende ba Fundu Minarai

Posted: 17 Feb 2018 11:45 PM PST
THETIMOR-NEWS.com, MANATUTO – Xefe Governu Mari Alkatiri hatete, Timor – Leste labele defende deit ba fundus husi mina rai, maibe tenke tau importansia ba setor hotu atu nune’e bele garante ekonoma iha tempu naruk tanba mina rai to tempu sei maran.

“Programa VII Governu nian atu tau importansia ba problema oin-oin ne’ebe mak iha, atu lori reativa fila fali ita nia agrikultura, se ita nia ekonomia depende nafatin deit ba mina rai la tau importansia ba setor sira seluk, aban bairua mina hotu ita mos hotu, nune’e hakarak ka lakoi agora ita tenke investe makas iha setor sira seluk,” dehan Primeiru Ministro (PM) Mari Alkatiri bainhira halo dialogu ho komunidade munusipiu Manatotu, iha salaun parokial S. Antonio Manatuto Vila, Sexta (16/02/2018).

Daudauk ne’e, povu Timor – Leste barak moris depende ba agrikultura. Tanba ne’e VII Governu avansa ho nia programa atu dezenvolve setor ne’e sai produtivu tebes hodi lori reseitas bo’ot ba falia hotu no ba estadu.

“Programa ne’e klaru tebes atu reativa setor sira laos agrikultura deit, edukasaun, turismu, saude no seluk tan ne’ebe presiza atu dezenvolve ho diak,” dehan PM Alkatiri.

Alende ne’e, nia esplika programa refere fo apoiu makas mos ba negosiasaun Tasi Timor atu nune’e kria alta autoridade ida hodi nune’e bele hatene lolos fronteira tasi Timor – Leste ho nasaun vizinu sira.

“Prosesu negosiasaun Tasi nian agora lao daudaun hela komesa hetan ona rezultadu diak uitoan, maibe sei kontinua lao nafatin, ita halo negosiasaun tasi ne’e laos deit ho Australia, tuir mai tenke halo mos ho Indonezia iha tasi mane mos tenke halo negosia ho sira husi tasi feto mos tenke halo negosia tanba pulau barak mak besik los ita ne’e, negosiasaun ida ne’ebe susar tebes tanba ita ne’e iha klaran atu alkansa objetivu sira ne’e tama hotu iha programa ne’e nia laran maibe rejeita tiha,” dehan PM Alkatiri.

Nia hatutan, bainhira halo negosiasaun ho Indonezia dahuluk tenke hakotu tia negosiasaun fronteira rai maran hafoin hakat ba tasi.

Hortencio Sanches | Editóra: Agida dos Santos | Photo: TTN/Jose Samuel

Timor-Leste tenta último esforço para resolver impasse sobre poços de Greater Sunrise

Posted: 17 Feb 2018 11:25 PM PST

Díli, 17 fev (Lusa) – Timor-Leste, a Austrália e um consórcio de empresas petrolíferas tentam esta semana, sob mediação das Nações Unidas (ONU), chegar a um acordo para o desenvolvimento dos campos de Greater Sunrise, no Mar de Timor, essenciais para o financiamento timorense.

As reuniões, que decorrem em Kuala Lumpur, na Malásia, são as últimas antes do fim do trabalho de uma Comissão de Conciliação solicitada por Timor-Leste no âmbito da Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre a Lei do Mar (conhecida pela sigla UNCLOS).

Díli e Camberra conseguiram já, através da mediação dessa comissão, alcançar um acordo histórico para um tratado de delimitação de fronteiras marítimas, que vai ser assinado a 06 de março em Nova Iorque, na presença do secretário-geral da ONU, António Guterres.

Como a Lusa avançou no início deste mês, o acordo, cujos contornos exatos ainda não são conhecidos, coloca a linha de fronteira na posição defendida por Timor-Leste, ou seja, a meio caminho entre os dois países, como Díli sempre reivindicou.

A linha mediana resolve quase definitivamente as fronteiras na região, tendo depois Timor-Leste de concluir, com a Indonésia, a delimitação de outas zonas fronteiriças.

Apesar do êxito nas negociações do tratado, que foi esta semana aprovado pelo Governo timorense, a equipa liderada por Xanana Gusmão (ex-Presidente e negociador principal) e Agio Pereira, ministro de Estado no atual Governo e que vai assinar o documento em nome de Timor-Leste, não há ainda acordo sobre a exploração do Greater Sunrise.

Esta semana as redes sociais timorenses, incluindo páginas oficiais do partido presidido por Xanana Gusmão, o Congresso Nacional da Reconstrução Timorense, divulgaram uma suposta mensagem enviada pelo líder timorense em que este pede a todos que rezem pelo êxito das negociações.

A mensagem, em tétum, refere-se aos encontros de Kuala Lumpur e às duas alternativas de desenvolvimento do Greater Sunrise, com o gasoduto para Darwin ou para Beaçu, no sul de Timor-Leste.

Apelando à ajuda dos ancestrais para que apoiem a delegação timorense, a mensagem pede rezas a todos os timorenses, destacando em particular os estudantes, já que os recursos petrolíferos “também são o seu futuro”.

“Peço que todos se mobilizem para ir à Missa rezar a Deus para que nos abençoe e ajude”, lê-se na mensagem.

Em cima da mesa estão três potenciais cenários, a de uma exploração flutuante, defendida pelas petrolíferas que têm a concessão do Greater Sunrise – Woodside, ConocoPhillips, Royal Dutch Shell e Osaka Gas -, a ligação ao gasoduto já existente que liga outros poços no Mar de Timor a Darwin (norte da Austrália) ou a ligação por gasoduto ao sul de Timor-Leste.

A decisão determinará a partilha de receitas do recurso, com Timor-Leste a receber 70% se o gasoduto vier para território timorense e 80% se for para Darwin, segundo fonte conhecedora das negociações.

Localizados em 1974, os campos do Greater Sunrise contêm reservas estimadas de 5,1 triliões de pés cúbicos de gás e estão localizados no Mar de Timor, aproximadamente a 150 quilómetros a sudeste de Timor-Leste e a 450 quilómetros a noroeste de Darwin, na Austrália.

ASP // SR | Foto: GMN TV

Publicação de calendário eleitoral em Timor-Leste preocupa responsável

Posted: 17 Feb 2018 11:16 PM PST
Díli, 17 fev (Lusa) – O responsável do Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral (STAE) timorense manifestou hoje preocupação com os prazos de publicação do calendário eleitoral, defendendo uma “republicação” do decreto presidencial de convocatória das eleições antecipadas.

O diretor-geral do STAE, Acilino Manuel Branco, disse à Lusa que a preocupação se deve ao cumprimento do artigo 18.º da lei que regula as eleições parlamentares e que define que este órgão tem de publicar o calendário das operações eleitorais “nos oito dias seguintes” à publicação do decreto presidencial que convocou o voto.

“O decreto do senhor Presidente foi publicado a 09 de fevereiro e, apesar de dizer que só entra em vigor a 20 de fevereiro, a lei refere expressamente que se trata de um prazo de até oito dias depois da publicação”, explicou o responsável do STAE.

Segundo Acilino Manuel Branco, “a solução poderia ser a Presidência republicar o decreto na segunda-feira e o STAE publicaria, no dia seguinte, o calendário”, insistindo que não está em causa nem o cumprimento de qualquer dos preceitos eleitorais, nem do calendário e processo de voto em si.

Fonte da Presidência rejeita a preocupação, esclarecendo à Lusa que todos os aspetos do calendário eleitoral foram devidamente acordados com o STAE e com a Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE).

Para a Presidência da República tratou-se de tentar, ao mesmo tempo, anunciar a data das eleições o mais rapidamente possível, respondendo assim à pressão dos partidos e da sociedade em geral, mas ao mesmo tempo cumprir os prazos técnicos recomendados pelos órgãos eleitorais.

Daí que, explica a fonte ouvida pela Lusa, o decreto com o anúncio tenha sido assinado a 07 e publicado a 09 de fevereiro, mas “determinando explicitamente que só entrava em vigor a 20 de fevereiro”, na próxima terça-feira.

Entre o dia da publicação e o da entrada em vigor, “aplica-se o princípio de ‘vacatio legis’, ou seja ‘vacância da lei'”, pelo que, efetivamente, a lei em causa não está em vigor, como define a lei 1/2002, de publicação dos atos.

Assim, reitera a fonte, o STAE “pode manter os prazos previstos”, publicando o calendário tal como previsto a 20 de fevereiro.

Na terça-feira, data anunciada para a publicação e divulgação do calendário eleitoral, está previsto um encontro de trabalho alargado envolvendo os órgãos eleitorais, as forças de segurança e representantes do Governo.

ASP // SR
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